This note presents a kind of the strong law of large numbers for an insurance risk caused by a single catastrophic event rather than by an accumulation of independent and identically distributed risks. We derive this result by a large diversification effect resulting from optimal allocation of the risk to many reinsurers or investors.
It is well-known that the expected value premium principle is justified by the law of large numbers. Namely, if an insurance company has a collection of risks W 1 ,W 2 , . . ., which is independent and identically distributed, then by the strong law of large numbers in probability theory, we have
with probability one. Thus the averaged risk is approximately amount to the capital given by the expectation of the individual risk. This means in general that by collecting independent risks and by adding the expected value premium we can decrease the uncertainty of the risk to zero eventually.
The objective of this note is to ask how about the case where the risk is caused by a single catastrophic event rather than by an accumulation of a large number of independent events. In this case, of course, we cannot apply the strong law of large numbers in probability theory. Instead, we approach to this problem by considering a diversification of the single risk to a large number of reinsurers or investors.
To formulate the problem mathematically, suppose that an insurance company with initial capital w 0 has a risk with loss random variable X . Here we assume that X is bounded. Then the resulting position of the company at a terminal time becomes w 0 − X . Suppose moreover that this company would like to diversify this risk partly to another n reinsurers or investors, each of which has an initial capital w i , i = 1, . . . , n, as a reinsurance or a securitization. Let us denote by X 0 the risk that the originator covers, and by X i the one allocated to the i-th reinsurer or investor, for i = 1, . . . , n. Each participant is willing to accept this risk if the resulting expected utility is greater than or equal to that of the initial capital. The allocation problem is thus defined as
over all bounded random variables X i such that X 0 + · · · + X n = X . Here, u 0 denotes the utility function of the insured, and u i the one of the i-th reinsurers, i = 1, . . . , n. Note that in order the problem (1) to be feasible, the allocated random variables X i , i = 1, . . . , n, necessarily take negative values, which include benefits of the transaction for the participants.
The problem (1) is categorized as an optimal design of insurance policies or more generally as a risk sharing problem. See Borch [1] , [2] , Raviv [7] , Brühlmann [3] , Gerber [5] , and the references therein. It should be remarked that to our best knowledge, the limiting analysis with respect to the number of agents is not studied in the literature except Fukuda et.al [4] where some dynamic insurance pricing is examined.
Let us denote byX i ≡X
. . , n, a solution of (1). Then we will claim thatX
converges to E[X ] as n → ∞ with probability one. This implies that the optimal covering of the risk for the originator is approximately the expectation of the risk, so the expected value premium principle is justified provided that the risk is sold to a large number of investors.
To solve (1), first we assume that each player has an exponential utility function:
with a i > 0, i = 0, . . . , n. Then, for a given λ i > 0, i = 1, . . . , n, we consider
over all bounded random variable X i , i = 0, . . . , n such that X = X 0 + · · · + X n , where we have set λ 0 = 1. Suppose that {X i } n i=0 is a solution to the problem (2) for some
Then for {X i } satisfying X = ∑ n i=0 X i and the constraints in (1), we have
Hence {X i } n i=0 is a solution to (1). Therefore, our task is to solve (2) for any {λ } n i=1 and then choose {λ } n i=1 to satisfy (3). Now, by Borch's risk exchange theorem (see, e.g., Gerber and Pafumi [6] for a review with notation similar to ours), the optimal {X i } n i=0 exists and necessarily satisfies λ i u
almost surely. Thus the random variable
does not depend on i = 0, . . . , n, and so
Summing up the both side over i and then using X = ∑ i X i , we have
where a is defined by
Substituting this into (4), we obtain
Now consider the case where a 1 = · · · = a n and w 1 = · · · = w n for any n. Then we can expect X 1 = · · · =X n and so it is natural to assume λ 1 = · · · = λ n . In this case, the equalities just above becomeX
Further, the condition (3) implies
and by (6) we have
So, (3) for i = 1 is equivalent to
This equality determines λ 1 that we look for. (6) and (7) yield
Further
Here, a 1 /(na) = (na 0 + a 1 )/(na 0 ).
. From this we see
Therefore, (5) and (7) yield
Now, since a → 0 as n → ∞ and
we finally arrive at the following result:
Theorem. Under the assumptions and the notation above, the optimally diversified risksX 0 ≡ X The theorem means that under the assumptions that each agent has an exponential utility and the investors for the diversification are homogeneous, by diversifying the risk over many reinsurers or investors and by adding the expected value premium we can decrease the uncertainty of the risk to zero eventually. Moreover, the participants for the diversification lose nothing in the limit.
